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Abstract
The actual existence of collections of universes – multiverses – is
strongly suggested by leading approaches to quantum cosmology, and
has been proposed earlier as an attractive way to explain the apparent
fine-tuned character of our universe. But, how can such hypotheses be
tested? After briefly discussing the key distinction between possible
and really existing multiverses, and the importance of an adequate
generating process, we focus on elaborating how multiverse hypothe-
ses can be retroductively tested, even though they will probably never
be directly observed. In this approach, scientific acceptance of mul-
tiverses would rely on the long-term success and fertility of quantum
cosmological theories including them as essential elements or as in-
evitable consequences.
1 Introduction
As we struggle to understand our universe more fully, using all the resources
of physics, astronomy, cosmology and even philosophy, we are finding more
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and more indications that it may very well be just one of a very large num-
ber of universes, or universe domains. We often refer to such a collection,
or ensemble, of universes as a “multiverse.” If these preliminary indications
are correct, the multiverse to which our own universe belongs would have
emerged from some quantum cosmological process that, from our present
very limited perspective, is hidden in what we often refer to as the Big Bang.
In other words, the more we delve into trying to understand how our own
universe, or our own region of a much larger universe, was generated, the
more we encounter the likelihood that whatever primordial process was in-
volved generated a very large number of other universes, or universe domains.
The emergence of such multiverses was first proposed and discussed in
detail by Linde (1982, 1983a). In doing so he emphasized that a multiverse
as such is a collection of different universes, or one universe consisting of
different large regions, representing a wide-range of different properties and
different low-energy laws of physics (in particular, very different values of
the gravitational, electromagnetic and nuclear coupling constants, and very
different masses of the fundamental particles). Thus, as he then proposed, it
provides a way of explaining the apparent fine-tuning of our universe for com-
plexity (“the anthropic principle”). About the same time, Vilenkin (1983)
described in a similar vein the creation of many universes by inflationary
processes, without referring to their possible application to resolving the fine-
tuning issue. Soon afterwards Linde (1983b, 1990) developed his multiverse
idea much more fully in his chaotic inflationary scenario. Basically, Linde
envisions a primordial cluster of tiny, causally separate regions as physical re-
ality emerges from the Planck era, where quantum gravity dominates. Each
of these regions becomes a separate universe or universe domain – some inflat-
ing, and some not, depending on the value of the fluctuating scalar fields in
a given region as the transition to classical space-time is negotiated. Besides
Vilenkin’s and Linde’s work, many others (Sciama 1993, Leslie 1996, Deutsch
1998, Tegmark 1998, 2003, Smolin 1999, Weinberg 2000, Lewis 2000, Rees
2001) have since discussed general ways in which an ensemble of universes
might originate. More recently superstring theory has given more specific
impetus to the multiverse idea. Versions of it provide “landscapes” popu-
lated by extremely large numbers of vacua, each of which could initiate a
separate universe domain (Kachru, et al. 2003; Susskind 2003; Freivogel and
Susskind 2004; Freivogel, et al. 2005; the other articles in this volume, and
references therein).
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The recognition that our universe appears to be fine-tuned for complex-
ity, and for life and consciousness (Dicke 1961, Collins and Hawking 1973,
Carter 1974, McMullin 1993) has actually been an independent and earlier
stimulus to considering multiverses. If any one of a number of key constants,
or other parameters, describing our universe and its dynamics had slightly
different values, our universe would be so different that it would not support
chemically complex systems. Therefore, it would be forever without the pos-
sibility of life. This has become known as the “anthropic principle.” What
accounts for this apparent delicate adjustment of constants and parameters?
Why do they have the values they have, rather than other values? The ex-
istence of a large collection of universes, which represents a significant range
of possible cosmic parameter values and to which our own universe belongs,
would be a possible scientifically acceptable way of explaining such apparent
fine-tuning – even though it would not provide an ultimate philosophical ex-
planation. This solution was first suggested by Collins and Hawking (1973),
and has since become the predominant and really only scientific proposal for
resolving the anthropic enigma (see McMullin 1993, Carr 2006, and the other
articles in this volume, and references therein). If quantum cosmological pro-
cesses naturally produced a large variety of universes, including ours, then
we would simply find ourselves in one in which all the many conditions for
life and consciousness have been fulfilled. This would be similar to how we
might explain the very special conditions we enjoy on Earth and in our Solar
System – our Sun being one of several hundred billion stars in the Milky Way.
Of course, the multiverse answer to the fine-tuning puzzle is scientifically
acceptable only if multiverses themselves are really legitimate objects of sci-
entific inquiry! Are they? Some have argued that, since we shall never be
able to directly detect multiverses or make observations of them, they fall
outside the realm of scientific investigation (Gardner 2003). This impor-
tant question leads us directly to the focus of this chapter, the testability
of multiverse hypotheses as a philosophy of science issue. In other words
testability is a necessary condition for scientific legitimacy. Relying on the
fundamental insights of the American philosopher C. S. Peirce concerning
“retroduction,” and its development and historical confirmation as “the in-
ference which makes science,” by Ernan McMullin (1992), I argue that mul-
tiverse hypotheses are scientifically testable. Then, I shall briefly outline
what general scientific requirements must be met to satisfy the philosophical
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standards of retroductive testabililty. Before tackling the specific issue of
testability itself, I shall briefly address the connected issues of the difference
between possible and existing ensembles of universes – possible and really
existing multiverses – and the need for a definite generating process for any
existing multiverse. 1 Many of the points I shall emphasize in this regard
may seem obvious or trivial, but they are crucial in providing a secure basis
for our consideration of testability, as well as of other related physical and
philosophical issues.
2 Possible and Existing Multiverses, and Gen-
erating Processes
From both a physical and a philosophical point of view, it is crucial to dis-
tinguish between the ensemble of all possible universes or universe domains,
and any ensemble of existing universes (Ellis, et al. 2003, Stoeger, et al.
2004). Though we may conceive all possible universes existing, philosoph-
ically, it is almost certainly the case that only a subset of these actually
exists. Secondly, it is obvious that an existing ensemble of universes or uni-
verse domains requires some process or series of processes to produce them –
to actualize them. This is one of the challenges of quantum cosmology – to
determine the physics of the primordial process by which our universe was
born, and the collection of universes or universe domains, and their specific
properties, which have emerged in association with it. It is the set of all
existing universes which needs to be explained by cosmology and physics,
not the ensemble of possible universes. Finally, it is only the set of really
existing universes which would provide an adequate answer to the fine-tuning
problem (McMullin 1993, p. 371; Ellis, et al. 2003; Stoeger, et al. 2004).
1There are other important and fascinating philosophical issues raised by the possibility
of multiverses, such as those of realized infinity (can we really have an infinity of really
existing universes?), ontological and causal reductionism (can new qualities emerge in the
course of the evolution of a given universe, or all possible emergent qualities simply latent
in the physics from the beginning?), and that of the choice between the generic and the
special (can we completely avoid fine-tuning and/or special “initial” conditions?). But the
issue of testability, and the closely connected ones of possible and existing multiverses,
and the need for a physical generating mechanism, are the most urgent for multiverse
cosmology at present.
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Though we cannot adequately describe the spaceM of possible universes
m, we can set up a heuristic classical framework for doing so (see Ellis, et al.,
2003), based on different reasonable assumed sets of laws of nature – either
laws of physics or meta-laws that determine the laws of physics – the general
parameter classes of which all m have in common. 2 Without this we have
no basis for defining M. In general we must incorporate in M at least the
geometry of the allowed universes and the physics of the matter they con-
tain. Clearly, we do not have any way of reliably determining the contours
of what is really possible. However, on the basis of what does not contradict
philosophical or sensible physical principles, we can set up a parameter space
for what we presently consider possible universes (Ellis, et al. 2003; Stoeger,
et al. 2004).
In any really existing ensemble of universes or universe domains many
of the universes in M will not be realized, and some may be realized more
than once. Essentially, the physics of the primordial vacuum, or other fun-
damental configuration, out of which a given multiverse emerges, together
with that of the generating processes operating to produce it, will effectively
determine a distribution function f(m) specifying how many times each m
in M is realized (Ellis, et al. 2003). This expresses the contingency of any
multiverse actualization – the fact that not every possible universe has to be
realized – and the detailed physical dependence of the existing multiverse on
the underlying physics, whatever that may be. 3
2Such a classical, non-quantum-cosmological description ofM is provisional, not fun-
damental. It provides us with a preliminary systematic framework, consistent with our
present limited understanding of cosmology, within which to begin studying multiverses.
As quantum cosmology matures, we shall have to develop a more fundamental quantum
framework which takes such issues as quantum entanglement and decoherence into con-
sideration. It may very well be that as “the wave function of the universe” decoheres, an
entire ensemble of universes emerges. These would all be entangled with one another, and
“the wave function of the universe” would provide the fundamental basis for the quantum
ontology of the multiverse, as well as the seed from which it was generated. Then, we
might very well want to consider the meta-structure of the set of all possible “waves func-
tions of the universe.” However, at present we do not have an adequate theory of quantum
gravity, or of quantum cosmology, to enable us to proceed meaningfully in accomplishing
these two tasks.
3There are other technical issues related to this, of course, including whether or not we
can define a unique measure on theM and on its subset of realized universes.
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Two almost trivial implications follow from this. The first is that there is
no unique really existing multiverse – there are an infinite number of possible
such multiverses (that is distribution functions f(m) which could be defined
onM). Which is the one to which our observable universe belongs depends,
as I have stressed, on the primordial physics that is operative. The second
implication is that, though a knowledge of the primordial physics would give
us an account of the beginning of our universe and of the multiverse to which
it belongs, as well as of the apparently fine-tuned character of our universe, it
would raise the further even deeper question of its own origins, and whether
or not it and the processes it governs require fine-tuning. Here an infinite
regress lurks in the wings. From a philosophical point of view, then, any such
primordial quantum physics, though making our universe more intelligible
from a scientific point of view, would not provide an ultimate explanation
for it nor account for its ultimate origin. We would still be able ask with
good reason for an explanation of the primordial vacuum and for the physics
which governs it.
We have been discussing the need for a definite generating process for any
existing multiverse. That requires some definite, detailed quantum-gravity
physics, which in turn would have to be shown to determine the overall distri-
bution f(m), and the range of properties represented by f(m). Obviously, at
least one of those universes would have to have the properties of our universe.
This is very a demanding requirement! As we now know from considering the
apparent fine-tuned character of our universe, there are very narrow ranges
of values of the fundamental constants, and of other cosmic parameters (e.
g., the density of dark energy), that allow for chemical complexity and for
life. Outside of these ranges, complexity, and life, would not be possible.
A little reflection also assures us, besides, that it is the underlying physics
of the multiverse generating process which induces certain common features
of structure and content in all the universes it produces, despite their great
variety. Thus, it will be the basic link connecting all the universes in the
ensemble. Through that generating process they will all be governed by a
common set of fundamental primordial laws, or meta-laws. Otherwise, there
would be no reason to consider the universes to be members of the same mul-
tiverse, nor any way of relating them to one another. Their common origin
in a specific physical process, or chain of processes, governed by a common
physics in the only way of achieving that.
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Finally, in this regard, it is helpful to realize that there may be, as has
been often mentioned, innumerable multiverses which constitute reality. In
light of what we have just been discussing, all but our own multiverse would,
by definition, be causally and generationally disconnected from us. Thus,
we would evidently have no possible way of discovering their existence, nor
any reason to postulate their contribution to the intelligibility of our universe
(Stoeger, et al. 2004; Stoeger 2004). The only way that would be conceivable
is if the generating processes of those multiverses were associated with those
of ours. But in that case they would really be part of our multiverse.
3 Retroduction
From what I have just pointed out, it is fairly clear that really existing multi-
verses completely disassociated from ours will not be subject to any scientific
confirmation. We will never be able to rule them out, but we shall never be
able to present positive direct or indirect evidence for their existence. But
how about for the existence and character of our own multiverse – for uni-
verses or universe domains primordially connected in some way to ours? It
seems that, if they are connected in some way to our universe, e. g. by a
common generating process or an initial vacuum state, then there should be
in principle ways to find out about them.
There may, in fact, even be relatively direct ways, as pointed out by
Freivogel and Susskind (2004), who demonstrate that the bubble universes
out beyond our horizon are not, according string theory models, completely
decoupled. Our horizon will contain information, scrambled though it be,
concerning the other universes which exist beyond it and to which it is gener-
ationally linked. However, according to some experts in that field (Susskind,
private communication), recovering such information would probably not be
feasible – it would take an enormously long time.
There is an attractive and compelling approach to scientific testability
which would enable us to indirectly establish the existence of our multi-
verse, and its characteristics, in much more promising way – under certain
well specified conditions. This brings us to a consideration of C. S. Peirce’s
concept of of “retroduction,” or “abduction,” which has been rather com-
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pellingly argued by Ernan McMullin (1992) as “the inference which makes
science.” Retroduction, according to McMullin, is the rational process by
which scientific conclusions are most often and most fruitfully reached.
How does retroduction function? On the basis of what researchers know,
they construct imaginative hypotheses, which are then used to probe and to
describe the phenomena in deeper and more adequate ways than before. As
they do so, they will modify or even replace the original hypotheses, in order
to make them more fruitful and more precise in what they reveal and explain.
The hypotheses themselves may often presume or directly imply the existence
of certain hidden properties or entities (like multiverses!) which are funda-
mental to or consequent upon the explanatory power they possess. As these
hypotheses become more and more fruitful in revealing and explaining the
natural phenomena they investigate and their inter-relationships (rendering
them more and more intelligible), and more central to scientific research in a
given discipline, they become more and more reliable accounts of the reality
they purport to model or describe. Even if some of the hidden properties or
entities they postulate are never directly detected or observed, the long term
success and fruitfulness of the hypotheses indirectly leads us to affirm that
something like them probably exists.
Thus, from this point of view, the existence of an ensemble of universes
or universe domains would be strongly, though provisionally, supported (but
not logically deduced!). The fundamental retroductive requirement is that
the existence of the multiverse is a key component or consequence of hy-
potheses which are successful and fruitful in the long term. In other words,
as a basic, though observationally inaccessible component of the theory, it
provides greater intelligibility and understanding of our universe. The hy-
potheses themselves enable us to make testable predictions which, if fulfilled,
provide a more thorough and more coherent explanation of cosmic phenom-
ena we observe than competing theories do. If such indirect support is not
forthcoming, then all we can do is to treat the multiverse hypothesis as a
promising speculative scenario needing further development and requiring
further fruitful application. That is where we are now, I believe. But there
are definite prospects for improving our confidence in it.
At this point we should briefly indicate how we are to judge “long-term
success and fruitfulness” of a given set of hypotheses. In general, a theory is
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fruitful and qualitatively and quantitatively supported if it (McMullin 1992;
also, see Allen 2001): 1.) accounts for all the relevant data (empirical ad-
equacy); 2.) provides a continuing foundation for explanatory success, and
stimulates further fruitful investigation (theory fertility); 3.) establishes the
compatibility of previously disparate domains of observed phenomena (unify-
ing power); 4. manifests consistency (or correlation) with other established
theories (theoretical coherence). These are the broad criteria we need to
apply to specific theories predicting the existence of a multiverse. We now
briefly discuss what that involves.
4 Retroductive Testability of the Multiverse
Hypothesis
Relying on these insights concerning retroduction, then, we could make a
reasonable claim for the existence of a multiverse, if we could show that its
existence was a more or less inevitable consequence of well-established phys-
ical laws and processes. This is essentially the claim that is made for chaotic
inflation (Linde 1990). However, the challenge is that the proposed under-
lying physics has not been adequately tested, and may be untestable. We
need evidence that the postulated physics – particularly that governing the
quantum cosmological generating processes – is true in this universe.
Thus, there are two further basic requirements which must still be met,
once we have proposed a viable ensemble or multiverse theory. The first is to
provide some credible link between these vast extrapolations from presently
known physics to the physics in which we have some confidence. The second
is to provide some at least indirect evidence that the scalar potentials, or
other overarching cosmic principles central to generating bubble universes
(e. g., a superstring theory of a given type), really have been functioning in
the very early universe, or before its emergence.
The issue is not just that the inflaton has not been identified and its
potential is untested. It is also that, for example, we are assuming quantum
field theory remains valid far beyond the domain where it has been tested,
especially given the unsolved problems at the foundations of quantum theory,
the divergences of quantum field theory, and failure of the theory to resolve
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the cosmological constant problem.
Once these basic requirements are met, then the theory involving multi-
verses must, as it is further developed, continue to receive indirect support
from further theoretical and observational work, lead to new promising lines
of inquiry which open up and enrich cosmology, and contribute substantially
to the overall coherence and unity of physics and cosmology. In short, it
must, over time, continue to provide a reliable foundation for increasing our
understanding of our universe, its origin and its characteristics.
In conclusion, despite the rigor that it demands, the retroductive ap-
proach to scientific testability does open the way for scientific confirmation
of the existence of a multiverse to which our universe belongs, and thus to
a scientific resolution to the fine-tuning problem. Thus, at least potentially,
the issues connected with multiverses can be brought in from the realms of
pure metaphysics to those where scientific confirmation is possible.
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